What Is Buddha-Nature?

1. Buddha-Nature and East Asian Buddhism

East Asian Mahayana traditions crucially hinge on the notion of Buddha-Nature. Its idea is refreshingly encouraging — everyone has Buddha-Nature inherently, and once she realizes it, everyone can achieve enlightenment and nirvana. Most East Asian Buddhist schools have accepted this view of universal original enlightenment whether their primary focus is doctrinal studies or meditation practices. It is probably Zen traditions, which have been the most popular Buddhist schools in East Asia for more than a millennium, that refer to Buddha-Nature most frequently in their teachings.

Zen is a special tradition outside the scriptures.
One cannot succeed with words.
Zen points directly into the mind.
Seeing there your own nature, you attain Buddhahood.

This famous stanza of Zen traditions has been recited throughout East Asia for centuries. It is attributed to an Indian monk, Bodhidharma, who has been said to have introduced Zen to China.

The fourth line of this stanza refers to one’s own nature, which is the topic of this chapter. The stanza teaches that it is to be found in the mind. The nature to be discovered in the deepest level of one’s consciousness is none other than Buddha-Nature. Most East Asian Buddhist traditions have accepted Buddha-Nature as that which makes enlightenment and nirvana possible. Their idea is that if you see in your mind your own intrinsic nature, which is Buddha-Nature, and if you realize it and become one with it, you achieve enlightenment and nirvana. In this respect, you are originally an enlightened one, and all you need to do to get enlightened is to realize this truth.^[1]

The Silent-Illumination Meditation (黙照禪) School teaches that a Zen practitioner must completely purify her mind with meditations so that her Buddha-Nature, which has been buried and clouded by distracting thoughts, emotions, sensations, etc., should naturally emerge and illuminate with its infinite light. This emergence of one’s own Buddha-Nature is itself enlightenment and nirvana. The Phrase-Observing Meditation (看話禪) School uses somewhat different methods. It provides practitioners with paradoxical phrases so that they use the sayings as a sort of detergent to clean up and purify their minds rather aggressively. When the mind is completely cleansed and purified, Buddha-Nature will naturally be realized, and the practitioner will become one with it. This is enlightenment and nirvana. These two most influential Zen traditions were founded on their conviction about the existence of Buddha-Nature. For them, the realization of Buddha-Nature is enlightenment and nirvana.

Most East Asian Buddhist traditions have accepted the concept of Buddha-Nature. Its origin can be traced back to the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sutra that was responsible for Tathāgatagarbha traditions. Most scholars also agree that the Lotus Sutra and the Flower Garland Sutra, probably the two most influential Mahayana scriptures in East Asia, adopted and fully exercised the view of Buddha-Nature. Virtually all major East Asian Buddhist schools — Tientai (its foundational text is the Lotus Sutra), Huayan (the Flower Garland Sutra), and Zen schools — accepted Buddha-Nature with virtually no reservations. One cannot learn and practice traditional East Asian Buddhism without considering the notion of Buddha-Nature.

2. Tathāgatagarbha traditions

Tathāgatagarbha traditions teach that a Buddhist practitioner’s realization of Buddha-Nature triggers her enlightenment and nirvana. According to them, Buddha-Nature is an embryo, a seed, or a potential to become a Buddha that inheres in everyone (and, according to many Mahayana schools, in everything). In other words, every sentient (and insentient) being has Buddha-Nature and achieves her enlightenment when she realizes and identifies herself or becomes one with Buddha-Nature. The mysterious sensations and other-worldly experiences that Buddhist practitioners often report when they feel enlightened through meditations are interpreted as something that naturally accompanies their realization of Buddha-Nature. Buddha-Nature is understood as the cause or origin of these extraordinary experiences.

For example, a practitioner’s experience of bright light emanating from the deepest bottom of her consciousness is often attributed to the moment of her Buddha-Nature realization. It is Buddha-Nature that is believed to be radiating light. Some practitioners report experiences of lightning and thunder happening in their minds, and others assert that they enjoy utter calmness with pleasant sensations. However, this Buddha-Nature (and its realization) has been said to defy any attempt of definite verbal expression. The ultimate truth about it cannot be described in words. Buddha-Nature is something one must experience for herself to figure out what it is like to realize it. It is impossible to communicate it verbally or in any other way with anyone else. In short, the truth about Buddha-Nature is ineffable.

Tathāgatagarbha traditions claim that everyone can get enlightened because everyone essentially and inherently has Buddha-Nature. Their view has often been extended so much as to include such strengthened claims that you are in fact yourself Buddha-Nature, and that you will just have to understand and accept its presence for your enlightenment. In this respect, you are fundamentally a Buddha in the first place. Traditionally, this view has been called the thesis of original enlightenment (本覺 original awakening). Since everyone is already enlightened, all they need to do to become a fully-fledged Buddha is to realize this truth, and completely acknowledge and embrace the presence of their Buddha-Nature.

The birth of the idea of Buddha-Nature must have been encouraging to all Buddhists in Mahayana traditions. Hinduism and some Indian Buddhist schools argue that there are groups of people who are so heavily laden with bad karma and so poorly gifted in studies and meditations that they can never get enlightened or achieve liberation (nirvana) in their current lifetime. The Mahayana traditions in East Asia refused to accept the alleged existence of these unfortunate people. East Asian Mahayanists believe that everyone can achieve enlightenment and nirvana in this world in this lifetime — in principle, instantly, even right here right now. After all, people needed hope and encouragement, not frustration or despair, from their philosophy and religion. In this regard, the advent of the concept of Buddha-Nature was an expected development.

3. Buddha-Nature criticized

Something rare and unexpected in the history of Buddhism has happened for the past several decades, though. Critical Buddhists in Japan^[2]have waged massive attacks on the notion of Buddha-Nature and significantly undermined its plausibility to the point that the traditional view may no longer be sustained with reasonable philosophical support. According to these critics, Buddha-Nature is in fact none other than ātman, an individual’s inherent and fundamental essence and reality as presented by Brahmanism and Hinduism. These critics argue that all the extraordinary features of Buddha-Nature actually go against the Buddha’s teaching of non-self (anātman) and dependent arising (emptiness).

According to Tathāgatagarbha traditions, Buddha-Nature inheres in everyone (and everything). It is something immutable and indestructible. It is full of light and infinite wisdom. It is also often said to exist with its own mysterious nature of ‘emptiness.’ I will claim that this kind of mysterious emptiness is a result of the fallacy of reification from the phrase of “being empty of.”^[3] Buddha-Nature and this ‘emptiness’ are both real and substantial entities. All these wonderful characteristics of Buddha-Nature are exactly what Brahmanism and Hinduism teach about their ātman (self or soul). They all go straightly against the Buddha’s most basic teachings of non-self, dependent arising, impermanence, and emptiness. Let me briefly re-introduce the Buddhist conceptions of non-self and dependent arising before we proceed further to discuss the problems of the notion of Buddha-Nature.

3.1 Non-Self

‘Self (ātman)’ can be understood as the referent of the word “I” when we say it. It is not really a tangible entity like a specific part of our body, and we cannot physically point to it. Still, we would agree that when we utter the word “I” or “me,” what is referred to is our self. We may wonder exactly what that might be because we cannot pinpoint it. But we do not need a definite answer to this question because ātman is, after all, a religious, metaphysical, or spiritual entity that is said to defy any verbal description. In Indian traditions, ātman is what makes one oneself, that is, it is her intrinsic nature or essence. It exists on its own independently of any conditions. It is immutable, indestructible, and permanent. We may well see that the Western concept of soul is comparable to that of ātman. It is not a coincidence that these two concepts have often been used interchangeably in recent years. However, the Buddha’s claim, which makes his view remain in sharp contrast with other major religions, is that there exists no such a self (anātman, non-self).

One simple argument that the Buddha presented to support his view of non-self is that none of the parts (or processes) that constitute our existence satisfy any of the characteristics of self (ātman) described above. Persons are, according to the Buddha, made of five aggregates (or processes): Physical states (a body) and four kinds of psychological states (feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness). Each of these five aggregates is impermanent, mutable, and destructible. Our body changes constantly, and it does not last for eternity. It is never indestructible. We must also say the same to each of the four kinds of our psychological states. None of these five aggregates can exist independently of conditions, and none of them can be the constant referent of the word “I” when we say it. Even if all these five aggregates somehow get combined, the ‘composite’ entity does not satisfy any of the definitions of self. And there is no other part in our existence. Therefore, there is no self.

3.2 Dependent Arising

A more serious problem for the Mahayana Buddhist traditions in Central and East Asia, where the concept of Buddha-Nature was much appreciated, is the idea of Buddha-Nature that goes against the Buddha’s teaching of dependent arising (and its Mahayanist version, emptiness). Legend has it that the Buddha achieved his enlightenment as he realized the truth of dependent arising (pratītyasamutpāda): The truth that everything comes into existence, abides, and passes out of existence depending on conditions. Nothing can exist on its own independently of conditions. The Buddha did not recognize the existence of independent existence, that is, he did not believe in the existence of any substance. Since nothing can exist on its own, there is not a thing that can have its own intrinsic nature (svabhāva, self-nature), its essence that without which it is not itself. How could anything have its own essence if nothing can exist independently? For this reason, Mahayana traditions believe that everything is devoid of essence: Everything is empty.

However, Tathāgatagarbha traditions, which belong to Mahayana traditions historically, claim that everyone (everything) has Buddha-Nature inherently and essentially. Many East Asian Buddhist traditions that accept the Tathāgatagarbha view have claimed that it only takes the realization of the presence of Buddha-Nature for a Buddhist practitioner to obtain enlightenment and nirvana. For example, although Zen traditions have taught quite a variety of meditation methods to achieve enlightenment, virtually all of them have accepted the existence of Buddha-Nature. And in Zen traditions as well, the realization of Buddha-Nature, which takes place during practitioners’ meditation or at other moments of ‘epiphany,’ has often been regarded as their achievement of enlightenment and nirvana. Again, everybody has Buddha-Nature, and everybody can get enlightened.

No matter how impressive and encouraging these assertions may appear at first glance, there are critical questions we must ask about the view of Tathāgatagarbha traditions: Is Buddha-Nature not in fact identical with Brahmanic ātman? Is it not something that everyone essentially possesses, something that everyone really is? Can we not say that it is everyone’s intrinsic nature if no one exists without it? If everyone (and everything) has or is Buddha-Nature, does this not go against the Buddha’s teaching of non-self (anātman) and emptiness? Advocates of Buddha-Nature would find all these questions difficult to answer. I believe that the answer has to be yes to all of these.

It seems impossible to show clearly how Buddha-Nature differs from Brahmanical ātman. We cannot but admit that Tathāgatagarbha traditions’ Buddha-Nature is not consistent with the view of Early Buddhism where the Buddha explicitly taught Non-Self. It is also a historical fact that, partly due to the popularity of the concept of Buddha-Nature, some Mahayana traditions have even claimed, overtly, of the existence of True-Self. It is no wonder that Mahayana traditions have sometimes been criticized as being not a part of Buddhist traditions, but only a branch of Brahmanical/Hindu heritage.

3.21 Buddha-Nature vs. Dependent Arising

The concept of Buddha-Nature conflicts with the Buddha’s non-negotiable teaching of dependent arising (pratītyasamutpāda). Buddhists believe, following the Buddha, that everything arises, abides, and ceases only depending on conditions. If anyone claims that there exists something that does not follow this mode of existence, her view may not be regarded as a version of Buddhism. However, Tathāgatagarbha traditions’ Buddha-Nature does not come into, lasts, or passes out of existence depending on anything. It is claimed to exist continuously, not coming or going, not depending on any conditions. So, if Buddha-Nature exists at all, it exists outside the network of dependent arising, and it makes the Buddha’s enlightenment, which was possible by dint of his realization of the truth of dependent arising, false or at least incomplete. The alleged existence of Buddha-Nature flies in the face of the Buddha!

Buddhists can develop various philosophical arguments and try to refute claims of permanent existence, like ātman or self-nature. Let me present an argument that may well show us that the concept of Buddha-Nature is in fact logically inconsistent:

1) If there exists Buddha-Nature, it arises (and abides and ceases) depending on conditions or it does not.^[4]

2) If Buddha-Nature arises depending on conditions, its existence and nature depend on constantly changing conditions. Then, Buddha-Nature cannot exist independently, and it cannot have its own nature that is not constrained by conditions, which contradicts the concept of Buddha-Nature.

3) If Buddha-Nature does not arise depending on conditions, it must have originated from itself because it has not come from anything else. Then, Buddha-Nature existed or did not exist at the time of its self-origination.
1) If Buddha-Nature existed at the time, its self-origination would be impossible because nothing can originate from itself when it already exists.
3.2) If Buddha-Nature did not exist at the time, its self-origination would be impossible because nothing can come from nothing.

From 1), 2), and 3) above, we must conclude that Buddha-Nature does not exist.

The conclusion follows from the premises. Buddha-Nature does not seem to exist. On closer examination, however, this argument does not completely serve its purpose because it does not enumerate all the possible alternatives: That is, if Buddha-Nature exists, and if it does not arise (has not arisen) depending on conditions, it might have just continuously existed from the beginningless time — from the infinite past, so to speak. This surely is a metaphysical possibility that should not be dismissed quickly. Buddhists need a different argument to deny its possibility and prove the non-existence of Buddha-Nature once and for all. How could they do that?

3.22 Buddha-Nature as a simple and its conceptual difficulties

Buddha-Nature is believed to be ‘immutable and indestructible.’ A logical analysis of its concept,^[5] though, will philosophically refute Tathāgatagarbha traditions’ claim that Buddha-Nature exists and that it makes enlightenment possible. No entity made of physical, psychological, or conceptual parts can last permanently as the identical entity because that which is partite (anything that has parts) can in principle be divided by the parts it is made of and thus lose its identity. In other words, nothing composite can be permanently immutable or indestructible. Therefore, Buddha-Nature, if it is to be immutable and indestructible, must be a simple (which has no parts). This philosophically valid argument creates a series of logical difficulties for the proponents of Buddha-Nature.

1. If Buddha-Nature has properties, it would have them as its parts, and Buddha-Nature would become a composite. As we have seen above, composites are not immutable or indestructible. So, Buddha-Nature must be a simple. However, this view conflicts with the accepted concept of Buddha-Nature as being pure, radiant, blissful, enlightenment-realizing, everlasting, and so on. Buddha-Nature has these characteristics, although it is claimed to be not accurately describable.

Further, if Buddha-Nature is a simple and has no property at all, each of us should be able to exchange one’s own Buddha-Nature with anyone else’s because it would not matter which Buddha-Nature we have as long as we have one. But this would not be coherent with what we believe about Buddha-Nature. My Buddha-Nature is mine, your Buddha-Nature is yours, and there can be no exchange.

2.  If Buddha-Nature is a simple, it does not have a physical volume (extension). For, if it had any spatial volume, it would have spatial parts, and it would be a composite. Since Buddha-Nature does not have spatial volume, it does not exist in space. We will then need to ask a critical question^[6]: How can a person, which exists in space, have Buddha-Nature which is fundamentally non-spatial? Can there be any evidence for the person’s ‘ownership’ of Buddha-Nature?

Perhaps a person is not just her body but also her mind. And it is possible that Buddha-Nature resides in her mind, not in her body: That is, the locus of Buddha-Nature might well be her mind, and her mind has her Buddha-Nature. However, ever since Descartes argued that the mind is not spatially extended, philosophers have by and large agreed with him in this regard. The mind is believed not to be in space. Then, it would be at least equally difficult to see how to make sense of the view that the mind, which is a non-spatial entity, possesses Buddha-Nature, which is another non-spatial entity. How can a non-spatial entity have another non-spatial entity, and what is the nature of this ownership? No easy answer is in the offing.

3.  A simple is immutable and indestructible because it is not partite. This sounds familiar, and it seems to be true. We have been told by multiple religions and philosophies that such entities as soul and ātman exist for eternity as the same soul and ātman because they are simples and do not undergo any change or destruction. These entities have often been described as immutable, indestructible, and permanent. Strictly speaking, however, this is not true.

Buddha-Nature (and ātman) is supposed to exist through time with no change. Its existence in time is, though, composed of infinitely many time slices. In other words, it is a collection of all these Buddha-Nature instants. Buddha-Nature should then be understood as a (four-dimensional) composite made of the series of Buddha-Nature instants. It is not a simple. Its apparent immutability and indestructibility are only an illusion created by incredibly rapid replacements of distinct Buddha-Natures at every instant. The truth is that no simple can exist for more than an instant.^[7] But this point does not fit in with the accepted concept of Buddha-Nature.

1, 2, and 3 above show that the concept of Buddha-Nature as a simple faces additional philosophical difficulties. The argument in 3 proves that Buddha-Nature could not have existed with no change. This completes my argument in Section 3.21 that the concept of Buddha-Nature is in fact incoherent within the Buddhist philosophical system.

3.3 Emptiness

Let us now return to our previous discussion and look at one more place where the claim of Buddha-Nature falters. If Buddha-Nature is an intrinsic nature that everyone (and everything) inherently possesses, this view clearly conflicts with the Mahayana traditions’ doctrine of paramount importance: Everything is empty of intrinsic nature. Nobody or nothing would be empty of intrinsic nature if everyone and everything had Buddha-Nature. Buddha-Nature has been said to have wondrous characteristics, albeit ineffable, which enlightened ones can possibly experience and appreciate. It is only fair to say that Buddha-Nature has its own intrinsic nature (svabhāva, self-nature). This is the very reason that Critical Buddhists have claimed that the view of Buddha-Nature actually makes Tathāgatagarbha traditions a de facto branch school of Brahmanism/Hinduism, not of Buddhism. The Critical Buddhists argued that not only Tathāgatagarbha traditions but also the entire Zen traditions, which significantly rely on the notion of Buddha-Nature, should be ‘pruned from the Bodhi Tree.’

These simple points of Critical Buddhism have been quite devastating to the proponents of Tathāgatagarbha traditions and some other Mahayana schools in East Asia. I also believe it is hard to deny that the idea of Buddha-Nature is not consistent with the Buddha’s teaching of non-self and the Mahayanist understanding of emptiness. Apparently, this logical gap seems unbridgeable and the difficulties insurmountable. It is not a coincidence that there have been very few attempts to support the Tathāgatagarbha traditions, especially in Japan, for the past several decades ever since Critical Buddhists presented serious criticisms on the notion of Buddha-Nature. Should Mahayana Buddhists then abandon much of the East Asian Buddhist traditions of the past two millennia as something non-Buddhist and simply go back to the teachings of Early Buddhism — nothing but Early Buddhism?

4. “Buddha-Nature” as a second-order designator

I believe that there is a plausible and preferable way to interpret Buddha-Nature that makes its concept fit nicely into the theoretical system of Buddhism so that there may be no issue of inconsistency. I suggest that we view “Buddha-Nature” as a second-order designator of various physical and/or psychological states of Buddhist practitioners that are optimally conducive to their achievement of enlightenment (and nirvana) on given occasions. On this understanding, a Buddhist practitioner’s Buddha-Nature is not a separate or abstract ontological entity that exists on its own over and above, or alongside the appropriate physical and/or psychological state of the practitioner that is responsible for her enlightenment. I will argue that this interpretation, if it is successful, can avoid the difficulties that the proponents of Buddha-Nature have to face, that is, that Buddha-Nature is a real entity with its own intrinsic nature. Let me elaborate below on my view of “Buddha-Nature” as a convenient, second-order designator, beginning with an example.

Suppose that presidential election campaigns are currently going on in the U.S.A. Assume that four candidates are vying for the presidency: Elizabeth Warren, Bernie Sander, Ted Cruz, and JD Vance. Assume, again, that your friend Tanner says that he knows a presidential candidate, but he cannot identify the name of the candidate. This surely is a possibility if, for instance, Tanner is not really interested in U.S. politics. So, Tanner knows a presidential candidate although he does not know exactly who he or she is. Let us now ask a somewhat abstract metaphysical question: When Tanner says that he knows ‘a candidate,’ is this candidate someone who exists separately over and above, or alongside the set of four candidates {Elizabeth Warren, Bernie Sander, Ted Cruz, JD Vance}? A moment of thought will let us see that the answer should be neither. The candidate that Tanner claims he knows must be one of these four politicians in the given set. For otherwise there would have to be altogether five candidates {a presidential candidate, Elizabeth Warren, Bernie Sander, Ted Cruz, JD Vance}, which is absurd.

We may well understand “a presidential candidate” as a convenient designator that we use conveniently to pick out one of the four candidates when we do not know or do not want to identify a particular candidate. A presidential candidate is not an abstract entity. We need to note that the sheer presence of the term “a presidential candidate” does not bring into the world a new, real ontological entity that exists on its own, independently of individual candidates. Each name in the given set of {Elizabeth Warren, Bernie Sander, Ted Cruz, JD Vance} is the first-order designator of each person; and “a presidential candidate” is a second-order designator that conveniently picks out one or the other out of this set of persons on a given occasion.

The concept of second-order designators^[8] may not be familiar to most of us, but they are everywhere in our ordinary life. For instance, a primary color (for painters) is not a separate color that exists on its own over and above, or alongside the given set of three colors {red, yellow, blue}. The sole role of the second-order term/designator “a primary color” is just to pick out one of these three colors on a given occasion; it does not have an abstract entity as its own referent. You have a primary color when you have one of the three colors, and vice versa. That’s it, and that’s all. There is nothing mysterious about it.

Most of us would agree that an invention of an abstract concept does not automatically bring into the world a new entity. There is no such magic. For instance, “table” is a second-order term that refers to a particular entity we call ‘table’ in a place at a time; but it does not have its own abstract referent. In other words, a table is not an independent ontological entity that exists over and above, or alongside the set of particular tables {table1, table2, table3, …, tablen} in the world.

Also, we need to pay attention to the interesting fact that these tables do not commonly share significant intrinsic physical properties among themselves. Tables are made of a wide variety of materials: Wood, metal, plastic, clay, cement, granite, marble, glass, even ice, etc. And they have so many different shapes: Round, square, rectangular, oval, four-legged, three-legged, a dozen-legged, etc. In short, they do not share the same material bases or shapes; tables do not share the same intrinsic nature. And the second-order designator “table” does not require the presence of common intrinsic characteristics among the entities it picks out. It cannot refer to an essence (an intrinsic nature, svabhāva) of table shared by all the variety of entities — for the very simple reason that such an essence does not exist. Still, we can pick out a table with the term “table” (out of the set of tables) wherever and whenever we would like.

There are too many other examples to enumerate where we can apply the same insight of the foregoing discussion: Senator, pencil, vehicle, pump, house, the gene, wing, heart, … and so on and so forth. I believe we can agree that none of these common nouns, which are second-order designators, have their abstract referents independently of the given sets of entities. They do not refer to common intrinsic natures of all the entities in the sets, either, because there exist, to begin with, no such natures to share. Instead, each second-order designator just picks out one or the other in a given set of entities.

5. The Ontological Status of Buddha-Nature

Let us now return to the problem of Buddha-Nature’s ontological status. Relying on the discussion I presented above, I believe we may as well interpret “Buddha-Nature” as a second-order designator that refers, on a given occasion, to a physical state (φ) and/or a psychological state (ψ) of a Buddhist practitioner that is optimally conducive to the achievement of her enlightenment (and nirvana). In other words, the second-order term “Buddha-Nature” refers to one or the other in the given set of physical and/or psychological states {φ1, φ2, φ3, …, φn, ψ1, ψ2, ψ3, …, ψn} of a practitioner on a given occasion. They may be physical and psychological states typically produced by meditations, studies of Buddhist scriptures, moral conducts, and so on. The states φi and ψi, which are most conducive to the generation of enlightenment (and nirvana), must be different from person to person, and even in one person, the states vary over time.^[9]

It is clear from the above discussion that the term “Buddha-Nature” does not refer to an invariantly common intrinsic physical and/or psychological state across all Buddhist practitioners because practitioners have ‘widely heterogenous’ physical and psychological states. “Buddha-Nature” does not designate any intrinsic property commonly shared by all these states for the simple reason, again, that there is no such a state. It cannot even refer to one practitioner’s immutable state, either, because her physical and psychological states change constantly. Nor does it refer to any abstract metaphysical entity that may exist over and above, or alongside the given set of physical and psychological states. We need to remember that the term’s only function is just to pick out a physical and/or psychological state of a Buddhist practitioner that is most conducive to her enlightenment on a given occasion. In short, “Buddha-Nature” is a convenient second-order designator that refers to a different physical and/or psychological state on a case-by-case basis.

On this line of interpretation, Buddha-Nature is deemed not to exist on its own as a separate or abstract entity. What exists is a physical and/or psychological state to be picked out on each occasion, and “Buddha-Nature” is merely a designator that refers to it. Buddha-Nature cannot have its own intrinsic nature. The sole role of “Buddha-Nature” is to select a specific physical and/or psychological state, on a given occasion, which is optimally conducive to the possessor’s enlightenment and nirvana.

And the state picked out varies case by case. But each state is also a part of our dependently arising world in which no state can exist independently of conditions. So, no such a state has any intrinsic nature (essence), either. That is, every state which is referred to by the second-order designator “Buddha-Nature” is empty of intrinsic nature. I believe that, with my suggestion of interpreting “Buddha-Nature” as a second-order designator, we can avoid metaphysical difficulties that have seriously undermined the acceptability of the notion of Buddha-Nature. Further, we may well defend Mahayana traditions from the tough criticisms of Critical Buddhists.

Buddha-Nature has been thought to be an embryo, a seed, or a potential to become a Buddha. It was supposed to be a property, or some kind of ontological entity that everyone essentially possesses (or everyone essentially is). But we cannot reasonably accept the existence of Buddha-Nature understood this way within the framework of Buddhist philosophy. Buddha-Nature must be consistent with the Buddhist view of non-self and dependent arising (emptiness). However, with the suggestions that I have laid out above, I believe that we still can keep using this convenient concept or designator “Buddha-Nature” in Buddhism for practical purposes^[10] as follows.

It is a fact in the history of Buddhism that a number of Buddhist schools claimed that some people have no chance to get enlightened in this lifetime because they are overwhelmed by their bad karma and too poorly talented for studies or meditations to achieve enlightenment. However, Mahayana traditions (especially Zen traditions) have by and large advocated for the possibility of universal enlightenment: Everyone (every sentient being) can obtain enlightenment and nirvana in this world in this lifetime. For the purpose of encouraging everyone to keep trying to achieve enlightenment with no frustration or despair, the introduction of the new teaching of Buddha-Nature must have been a welcoming event to many Buddhist practitioners. This heartwarming idea of Buddha-Nature has performed its positive soteriological function for so many people for millennia. It has been used as a convenient tool (upaya) for Buddhist practitioners to help themselves and others achieve their ultimate goal of enlightenment and nirvana.

No matter how convenient and helpful this concept of Buddha-Nature might have been for its soteriological purposes, however, the ontological status of Buddha-Nature must somehow be accommodated within the Buddhist philosophical system. This is a theoretical requirement that should not be quickly dismissed under the name of “practical purposes.” As long as Buddha-Nature is regarded as something like Brahmanic/Hinduist ātman, it may not be accepted by philosophically acute minds of the Buddhist society. And we should not keep misleading people with a false metaphysical belief of Buddha-Nature that cannot in fact exist in the Buddhist world.

This is the primary reason that I suggest that we view “Buddha-Nature” only as a convenient second-order designator that picks out one or other physical and/or psychological states optimally conducive to the production of a given Buddhist practitioner’s enlightenment and nirvana on a given occasion. In my interpretation, since “Buddha-Nature” is only a term or a concept, it is not an ontological entity that really inhabits the world. So, the introduction of Buddha-Nature does not conflict with the Buddha’s teaching of non-self or dependent arising (emptiness). Also, what is to be picked out by this second-order designator is a physical state and/or a psychological state that exists in the network of things and conditions that arise dependently. These states also arise, abide, and cease to exist only dependently on conditions, and they are thereby empty of intrinsic nature. Neither “Buddha-Nature” nor a state it picks out has independent existence or intrinsic nature. There is no metaphysical difficulty involved here.

6. Conclusion

My analysis of Buddha-Nature helps keep its idea within the Buddhist philosophical system, causing no conflict with the Buddhist view of non-self and emptiness. There must exist for everyone a physical and/or psychological state optimally conducive to her enlightenment and nirvana on a given occasion. This very state is, on my interpretation, her Buddha-Nature at the given moment of time. So, after all, we can say that everyone has Buddha-Nature at every moment.

My view of Buddha-Nature preserves the concept’s soteriological function as well. A Buddhist practitioner is encouraged to find out this maximally enlightenment-conducive state at each moment of her life with, say, mindfulness, and she would need to make maximum use of it so that she can make the best progress toward her enlightenment and nirvana. After she makes some progress, since her various physical and psychological conditions must have changed, the practitioner will need to identify a different physical and/or psychological state as her new optimally enlightenment-conducive state, that is, her new Buddha-Nature. Buddha-Nature changes depending on conditions. It is also empty.