Dependent Arising and Emptiness

1. The Buddha’s Enlightenment and Dependent Arising

Buddhism is fundamentally a system of the Buddha’s teachings for enlightenment. “Buddhism” is a combination of the two words “Buddha” and “-ism.” “Buddha” is the title given to one who is enlightened. “The Buddha” literally means ‘the Enlightened One.’ Enlightenment, along with nirvana, is no doubt the ultimate goal of all Buddhists. But it has often been questioned: How did the historical Buddha achieve his enlightenment? What is it that he was enlightened of (or, awakened to)?^[1] In other words, what was the method of practice that the Buddha used on his path to enlightenment, and what was the content of truth that he became enlightened to?

Most Buddhist traditions recognize the Buddha’s intensive and prolonged meditations as his primary method of practice that guided him to enlightenment. Some traditions like Zen claim that nothing other than meditation can ever lead Buddhist practitioners to awakening. Most Zen traditions dismiss the importance of the textual study of scriptures and instead focus only on intensive meditation. However, if enlightenment can be obtained solely through meditation without any new discovery or knowledge of truth, enlightenment would simply become a matter of achieving some kind or level of consciousness with no content. Is the goal of enlightenment just an attainment of a specific type of consciousness? I doubt it. The Buddha achieved the deepest level of meditation long before he became enlightened. He needed something more for his awakening.

Traditions have it that the Buddha entertained the truth of dependent arising (pratītyasamutpāda) in his mind at the very moment of his enlightenment. I believe it would be natural to attribute the Buddha’s discovery and realization of the truth of dependent arising to his enlightenment. The truth of dependent arising might very well have been the content of truth that he awakened to. This interpretation is also consistent with the fact that most Buddhist traditions, except some Zen schools that focus on nothing but meditation, have regarded dependent arising as the core teaching of Buddhism.

2. Dependent Arising

Ten thousand things (everything) arise, abide, and cease to exist depending on conditions. Nothing can come out of nothing, and there is not a thing that can exist on its own. This is the way we have understood the meaning of the Buddha’s dependent arising, especially in Mahayana traditions of East Asia. In many early scriptures, the Buddha explained the meaning of dependent arising as follows:

When this is, that is;
This arising, that arises.
When this is not, that is not;
This ceasing, that ceases.

As is written, this famous verse does not convey much information. The paragraph appears to us as a riddle or enigma, or at best some kind of axiom in logic or mathematics. We can begin to make sense of it, though, if we apply it to the following twelve-linked chain of dependent arising that the Buddha taught.

The Buddha said the verse above when he referred to these links one by one.

Ignorance
(
karma (action, volition)
(
consciousness
(
name and form (mind and body)
(
six senses
(
contact
(
sensation
(
desire
(
attachment (grasping/appropriation)
(
existence (becoming)
(
birth
(
old age and death

On one hand, when ignorance is (arises), karma is (arises). When karma is (arises), consciousness is (arises). … When birth is (arises), old age and death are (arise). This series shows us how the suffering (duḥkha) of aging and death arises depending on its (previous) conditions. On the other hand, when ignorance is not (ceases), karma is not (ceases). When karma is not (ceases), consciousness is not (ceases). … When birth is not (ceases), old age and death are not (cease). This second series explains to us how we can remove the suffering of old age and death. We can end it by eliminating its (previous) conditions. This is the truth that the Buddha is said to have grasped at the very moment of his enlightenment.

The Buddha achieved enlightenment by realizing the truth that suffering arises, abides, and ceases depending on conditions. He discovered the origin of suffering (of life and death), and he also understood the way to eliminate it. As time passed by, however, ‘this’ and ‘that’ of the Buddha’s formulation of dependent arising came to have quite a comprehensive interpretation to the point that ‘this’ and ‘that’ subsumed everything that exists as cause and effect. If we agree that nothing in the world can come into existence without cause, it should follow that everything exists within causal relations. That is, everything arises, abides, and ceases depending on causal conditions. Dependent arising is the way that everything in the world exists. If you realize this truth, you will therefore understand the world from its most fundamental point of view. That’s enlightenment.

The Buddha’s insight on dependent arising may well be compared to Francis Bacon’s Table of Presence and Table of Absence. Bacon presented these tables as the methods of induction in Book II of his Novum Organum (1620). Let me explain his view using my example of salt and snow melting.

Bacon would believe that his inductive method shows us, from the table above, that it is a law of nature that using salt on snow brings about snow melting. There must be a nomological relation between the two types of events. Bacon claimed that his method effectively leads us to the discovery of ‘hidden schematisms’ or micro-structures of things that are the sources of all physical phenomena that we observe. It seems that both the Buddha and Bacon would agree that the ‘When this is, that is; when this is not, that is not.’ formulation successfully describes the way that things (events) come into and pass out of existence.

Philosophers of Buddhism would by and large agree, though, that it is David Hume’s view on causation^[2] that resembles the Buddha’s dependent arising most closely. According to Hume, the traditional and commonsensical understanding of causation is that the cause of an event possesses the power or hidden force to bring about the event (its effect). There is a necessary connection between the cause and its effect. Hume challenged this ‘commonsense’ from a thoroughly empiricist point of view as follows.

Suppose that a billiard ball Adam is in motion. It hits another billiard ball Bob which is at rest. Assume that Adam stops where Bob is, and that Bob begins to move from there. Adam’s motion and its impact on Bob is the cause of Bob’s movement. Commonsense tells us to believe that the power or hidden force possessed by Adam is transferred to Bob, and that this is why Bob comes to have its own power to move. So, there is a necessary connection between Adam’s impact on Bob (cause) and Bob’s movement (effect). According to Hume, however, our commonsense only leads us to false beliefs on the nature of causation.

Hume asks us simple questions to support his claim. Have we ever observed the hidden force or power itself that Adam supposedly has? No, we see Adam moving, hitting Bob, and staying where Bob used to be, but our senses do not in any way capture the existence of a hidden force or power itself. If we stop Adam in motion with a hand, we may experience a dull sensation from the impact. One may ‘naturally’ infer, from the dull sensation, the presence of a power in the moving ball that is responsible for it. However, the hidden force or power of the ball is only commonsensically inferred, not empirically confirmed. Its existence is of an imaginary kind. It’s a fiction. The ‘necessary connection’ between every cause and effect also faces the same criticism. It has never been observed; it’s been only imagined to exist.

Hume’s analysis has often been characterized as a regularity approach to causation. Let me use the same example to explain. When Adam in motion hits Bob at rest, Adam stops and Bob begins to move. The same process of two events happens over and over again whenever Adam hits Bob. The same kind of series of events takes place repeatedly and regularly to other pairs of balls under similar circumstances. There is no hidden force or power ever observed anywhere. Nor is there any necessary connection perceived between cause and effect. There is only a regularity or pattern between two types of events: When this (type of event) is, that (type of event) is. I bet both the Buddha and Hume would also agree to add the following sentence: When this (type of event) is not, that (type of event) is not.

Buddhism also does not recognize the existence of a hidden force or power, or any necessary connection between cause and effect. Most notably, the Madhyamaka schools of Mahayana traditions, which were formed several centuries after the Buddha’s time, developed a series of arguments and proved that causes cannot have intrinsic natures – including hidden force or power – and that there is no necessary connection between cause and effect. I will return to this issue later in this chapter.

3. Causation and Non-Causal Connection

There is no question that causation is the representative relation of dependent arising. Philosophers by and large agree that there are two typical indicators of causation.

(1) There is a time gap between cause and effect.

(2) There are intermediary stages between cause and effect.

An example can explain these indicators. Suppose that Brutus stabs Caesar. Brutus’ stabbing results in Caesar’s death. In other words, Brutus’ stabbing is the cause of Caesar’s death. But a stabbing does not bring about an instant death. After Caesar is stabbed, he bleeds progressively more, some other complications follow, and he eventually dies. His death takes time to happen. And there are intermediary stages between Brutus’ stabbing and Caesar’s death. One can prevent Caesar’s death by blocking one of those stages, say, by stopping the bleeding before it’s too late. The two indicators seem to be present everywhere in our ordinary experiences of causal relations.

However, there have been challenges to these indicators of causation. A number of physicists have reported their observation and interpretation that a pair of particles in quantum entanglement shows cases of backward causation where an effect appears to take place before its cause.^[3] Philosophers have also speculated about the possibility of simultaneous causation. For example, somewhere in this universe or in a possible world, there may be two suns that revolve around each other, keeping the same distance due to the balance of their forces pulling and pushing each other. These two examples present possible challenges to the traditional view on the nature of causation. But there is an issue of different interpretations of the examples, which makes it difficult to regard them as counterexamples.

The Buddha’s dependent arising has been understood as referring to causal relation. As Mahayana Buddhism spread out to East Asia, however, the extension of dependent arising came to include non-causal connections as well. For instance, the Flower Garland School of China, which has been one of the most influential Buddhist traditions in East Asia ever since the 7th Century, expanded the interpretation of dependent arising most comprehensively. It claims, in a nutshell, that everything is connected to everything and that everything arises dependently on everything in the world. Most other East Asian Buddhist traditions such as Tientai Schools and the Zen traditions also share much of this view of the Flower Garland.

East Asian Buddhist understandings of dependent arising, which incorporate non-causal connections as well, are in fact quite close to our commonsense knowledge of how the world is. For instance, we know that there can be no wife without her husband. Let us now substitute “wife” and “husband” for “this” and “that” respectively in the Buddha’s formulation of dependent arising: When a wife is, her husband is; when a wife is not, her husband is not. The two concepts of ‘wife’ and ‘husband,’ and also a wife and her husband in the world, depend on each other for their existence as such. They arise, abide, and cease depending on each other. Let me give more examples.

You cannot become a parent without your child. Up is up because there is down, right and left always come together, there is no east without west, front is front only because there is back, and so on. There are indefinitely many examples of this kind that satisfy the Buddha’s formula of dependent arising. None of them satisfy the typical criteria of causation – a temporal gap and intermediary stages. Southern traditions in Buddhism may claim that these relations are only conceptual and that they are not actual constituents of the world. East Asian Buddhist traditions disagree. For them, both these concepts and the entities subsumed by these concepts arise depending on each other.

Contemporary physics has reported to us that some physical relations may not be understood as causal although they do exist as physical relations in the universe. For instance, the directions of spins of paired particles in quantum entanglement are mathematically calculated, but there is no temporal gap or intermediary stages between them. They are not just conceptual entities, either. They exist as related physical phenomena, but we cannot apply the traditional concept of causation to their relation. All we can say might be that they are mathematically related – simply because there seems to be no better way to describe their relation. Contemporary physics confirms the existence of physical relations that are not causal. A good number of East Asian Buddhists are willing to accept as a subset of the relations of dependent arising these numerous non-causal relations observed among paired particles in quantum entanglement.

If Buddhists understand the Buddha’s dependent arising only as causal relation, they must admit that the Buddha’s enlightenment did not reach far enough to include the world of particle physics. This lack of explanatory power would make the Buddha’s enlightenment imperfect, which most Buddhists would find embarrassing. Dependent arising may well be understood as including not only causal relations but also mathematical, conceptual, and other non-causal relations. I adopt this most comprehensive and quite flexible interpretation of dependent arising for the rest of the discussion in this chapter.

4. Dependent Arising and Emptiness

The following is a well-known passage from Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā that shows us how the Buddha’s dependent arising (dependent origination) has been understood in Mahayana traditions, especially in East Asia.

Dependent origination we declare to be emptiness.
It [emptiness] is a dependent concept; just that is the middle path.^[4]

Commentators of Mūlamadhyamakakārikā by and large agree that Nāgārjuna purports to say with the first line of this verse that what arises dependently is empty of intrinsic nature (svabhāva, self-nature). Since everything arises, abides, and ceases depending on conditions, everything is empty. But what does this mean?

Nāgārjuna presents a series of arguments to prove that, unless things are empty, there will be no change or movement, which contradicts what we know about the world. For example, suppose that cause and effect have their own intrinsic natures. In other words, assume that they are not empty of intrinsic nature. According to Nāgārjuna, this assumption leads us to a reductio ad absurdum as follows.

Suppose that soybeans are a cause of tofu and that both soybeans and tofu are real (that is, not empty) in the sense that they have their own intrinsic natures.^[5] Then,

(1) The effect (tofu) either exists or does not exist in the cause (soybeans).

(2) If tofu already exists in soybeans, causation is pointless and impossible. There is no causation if the effect already exists.

(3) If tofu does not exist in soybeans, causation is incomprehensible because it is impossible to explain how and why tofu comes out of soybeans but not from rocks, trees, etc.

From the assumption and (1), (2), and (3), causation should be impossible. However, we know that tofu comes out of soybeans. Therefore, by reductio, the assumption must be denied. That is, it cannot be the case that soybeans (cause) and tofu (effect) are real with their own intrinsic natures. Therefore, cause and effect must be empty of self-nature. And everything that is a product of causation is also devoid of intrinsic nature.^[6]

Nāgārjuna uses mostly indirect arguments to prove that dependently arising things are all empty of intrinsic nature. Now that we have seen the gist of his argument, we may well try a more straightforward argument.

(1) That which exists depending on conditions cannot exist on its own. No such a thing is a substance or a real entity.

(2) That which cannot exist independently cannot have its own self-nature (intrinsic nature).

(3) Everything arises, abides, and ceases depending on conditions.

Therefore,

(4) Nothing can have self-nature. Everything is empty (of self-nature).

All Buddhists accept the Buddha’s dependent arising in (3). Dependently arising things are devoid of intrinsic nature. Therefore, as Mahayana traditions claim, everything is empty.

Let us try to make more intuitive sense of emptiness. What is the intrinsic nature of a particular pen, for instance? It is a piece of stationary we use to write. But it will become a building material if we collect billions of them and build, say, a house. It may become an artistic masterpiece if we decorate it masterfully with precious metals and put it on exhibition. It can also be used as a weapon – as in spy movies. The pen cannot sustain any of these characteristics as its essence. This point applies to virtually everything we know.

One may point out that being a piece of stationery, a building material, an artistic piece, a weapon, etc., are all extrinsic properties, and it goes without saying that none of them qualify as intrinsic nature. The objection may continue such that it should be the pen’s parts and their relations that constitute its intrinsic nature. This view does not really stand a chance, however. For, if everything that the pen does is done by its parts and their relations, there is nothing that the pen does as an independent entity. Also, if everything about the pen is explained by its parts and their relations, we do not in principle need the pen to explain what it is. In short, the pen’s parts and their relations effectively eliminate the pen from the ontology rather than provide its intrinsic nature. And it goes the same to everything composite.^[7]

Is there anything that makes a given person the person she is? What is her self-nature that is uniquely hers and absolutely immutable? Does her name make her who she is? No, she can change her name. Does her job, then? No, she can get a different job. Does her body constitute her intrinsic nature? No, her body changes all the time. How about her DNA? No, her DNA also changes over time, naturally and by accident. Do her thoughts qualify? No, they also change, in fact faster than her body does. And so on and so forth. There is also nothing about her that is uniquely hers. She does not have an intrinsic nature. Persons are all empty. We are empty persons.

5. Is Dependent Arising Identical with Emptiness?

Nāgārjuna’s declaration that dependent arising is emptiness has enormously influenced the direction of the development of Mahayana traditions. The Buddha’s teachings of Non-Self and dependent arising were both understood to be included in the single Mahayanist thesis of emptiness. In early scriptures (Nikayas), the Buddha presents various arguments to show that no person has a self (Non-Self, anātman). He also teaches that not only persons but everything else lacks ātman. This early Buddhist view does not differ from the Mahayanists’ contention that everything is empty of intrinsic nature. Also, since dependent arising was declared to be emptiness, a considerable number of East Asian Buddhists have believed that dependent arising is, in the sense of ‘is identical with,’ emptiness. In short, Mahayanists’ emptiness has been thought to incorporate both the Buddha’s Non-Self and dependent arising.

However, I believe that the presumed identity of dependent arising and emptiness can be shown to be controversial, if not outrightly false. First of all, we need to note that the concept of identity is a philosophically rigorous one. We ordinarily use the expression “an identity relation” very flexibly. For instance, the four sides (a, b, c, d) of a square are typically described as “a = b = c = d” in math textbooks. What this equation means is, though, that only the length of each side is the same. It should not mean that the four separate sides a, b, c, and d are numerically one entity. It’s a simple truth that the four sides of a square cannot be numerically one entity. Strictly speaking, therefore, “a = b = c = d” does not stand for an identity relation.

We will adopt, for the remainder of this chapter, a rigorous concept of identity to see whether dependent arising is in fact identical with emptiness. If an entity a and an entity b are identical, they must be numerically one like ‘Cicero and Tully,’ ‘Hesperus (the Evening Star, Venus) and Phosphorus (the Morning Star, Venus),’ and ‘water and H₂O.’ The entity, which is both a and b, cannot undergo fission in any possible world and become two separate entities. None of the pairs I enumerated in this paragraph can become two distinct entities under any counterfactual situations. If a and b are identical, a and b must necessitate each other. They must be necessarily identical.

‘a is identical with b.’ is true if and only if
(i) a necessitates b, and (ii) b necessitates a.

The identity of dependent arising and emptiness is not about the identity of two concepts. The meanings of “dependent arising” and “emptiness” are clearly different. They are not the same concept. Buddhists would not want to regard dependent arising and emptiness as abstract entities like properties or universals in metaphysical space, either. As most commentators of Mūlamadhyamakakārikā agree, when it is claimed that dependent arising is emptiness, what it is actually meant is that dependently arising things are empty things.

Nāgārjuna proved with his reductio that dependently arising things lack intrinsic nature. If things had self-nature, there would be no change or movement in the world. But we know that things arise depending on conditions and that there are changes and movements. Therefore, by reductio, things do not have intrinsic nature; they are empty. I also showed at the end of the previous section that dependently arising things are all empty of intrinsic nature. In this regard, I believe we can agree that dependently arising things do necessitate empty things. There can be no counterfactual situation in which the former group of things are not the latter group of things.

Then, what about the other way around? Are empty things necessarily dependently arising things? In our world, everything is empty, and everything arises depending on conditions. They are coextensive. However, can there be a possible world in which empty things do not arise dependently? If there is any, empty things are not coextensive with dependently arising things in that world. We will then have to conclude that empty things are not necessarily dependently arising things. If this is true, the two groups of things do not necessitate each other, and dependent arising cannot be identical with emptiness. I argue that there exist such possible worlds where the two groups of things are not coextensive, and that dependent arising is not in fact identical with emptiness. Let me suggest one such world as follows.

Suppose that Amitābha Buddha creates his second Pure Land. He builds up this world in such a way that everything in it arises depending on conditions. Then, everything must also be empty of intrinsic nature. We have already seen earlier in Section 4 that dependently arising things are empty things. Amitābha Buddha does not have to do anything to make everything in this world empty after he has ‘instilled dependent arising’ there.

However, assume that Amitābha decides to create yet another world. This time, he creates everything in it empty of intrinsic nature and leaves the world at that. He does not do anything else in this world. Will there be any change or movement there? Do the empty things of this world arise depending on conditions? Can we say, ‘When this is (arises), that is (arises).’ in this world? I do not think we can. Unless there is an initial movement, say, a snap of Amitābha’s fingers to move things around, these empty things will never change or move. We need something like Aristotelian Unmoved Mover to bring in ‘dependent arising’ to this world. Otherwise, this empty world will remain pretty much dead – no change, no movement, no arising of anything. In this world, empty things are not dependently arising things. We must then conclude that empty things are not necessarily coextensive with the things that arise depending on conditions.

One may wonder whether such a world can be created at all. She may doubt that there is a world where things are all empty but do not arise dependently. Although I do not see any logical contradiction or epistemic difficulties in its possibility, I would then suggest that we imagine a counterfactual situation in which this Saha world of ours, where everything arises dependently and is thereby empty, comes to a full stop. There is no change or movement in this situation. Nothing comes into or passes out of existence depending on anything – in other words, there is no dependent arising in this world. Also, since nothing can come out of nothing, no intrinsic nature can come into existence where everything is already empty. Everything will remain empty. I believe that this counterfactual situation presents us a possible world where everything is empty but no dependently arising thing exists at all.

Dependently arising things and empty things are coextensive in our world, but they should not be regarded as identical because they are not necessarily coextensive. Dependently arising things are necessarily empty things, but empty things do not necessitate dependently arising things. Since the philosophical (metaphysical) sense of identity requires necessary identity, that is, numerical one-ness across all possible worlds, we must conclude that dependently arising things are not identical with empty things to begin with. In short, dependent arising is not identical with emptiness.

6. Neither Existents nor Non-Existents

Those who are not familiar with Buddhism often get the impression that Buddhism is a form of nihilism. Many of them believe that the Buddha taught that life in this world is full of suffering (duḥkha) and that there is no point of living in this world. This is a common misunderstanding about Buddhism. The Buddha wanted to point out and reveal first the true mode of our existence, which is dissatisfactory (suffering), so that we can solve the problems of life. How can a doctor cure a patient unless she first recognizes and identifies the illness itself?

Likewise, there have been misunderstandings about the true import of the thesis of emptiness. When Mahayanists (especially, Madhyamikas) claim that everything is empty, they do not mean that nothing exists. Their point is just that nothing can exist on its own with an intrinsic nature. Things exist the way we have always observed them to be, but we need to note that none of them in fact have self-nature. In other words, they are empty (of self-nature). That’s it, and this is what their claim of emptiness purports to mean. This view is certainly not a form of nihilism or annihilationism.

It should be clear that the teaching of emptiness lets us avoid the essentialist view that there are real entities with intrinsic natures. There is no such an entity with immutable self-nature. Hence, emptiness avoids both the two extremes of annihilationism and essentialism. We now can see the meaning of the sentence quoted earlier from Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā: “just that [emptiness] is the middle path.” When Buddhists in East Asia cite the phrase “neither (real) existents nor non-existents,” as they often do, what they mean is that things in the world are neither ultimately real existents with self-nature nor non-existents. They are empty, and their ontological status is somewhere between or just away from both essentialism and annihilationism.

Things in our world are often called ‘fictions’ or ‘illusions’ in most East Asian Buddhist traditions. After all, fictions or illusions are not real entities with intrinsic nature. But they are not non-existents, either. We might also describe the way a thing exists as ‘It is not a something, but it is not a nothing, either.’ They just exist well and mysteriously.

The quoted passage earlier from Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā has the following sentence as well: “It [emptiness] is a dependent concept.” What this means is that emptiness is not a real existent. Things are empty of intrinsic nature, and the abstract noun “emptiness” is derived from the predicate “is empty of.” If one mistakenly accepts emptiness as a real entity with its own nature, she commits the fallacy of reification from a predicate. One may think of this fallacy as an unlikely mistake to make. Historically, however, many schools of Mahayana traditions have regarded emptiness as an ultimately real entity with its intrinsic nature, although Nāgārjuna and his commentators have firmly warned against it from many centuries ago. It is unfortunate that emptiness has often been interpreted as something like Brahmanic ātman in some Mahayana traditions.

Let me present the following paradox that I believe must result from the erroneous reification of emptiness. If we regard emptiness as a real entity with its own nature, we face the following logical problem.

(1) Emptiness is itself either empty or not empty.

(2) If emptiness is empty, it is not empty. Emptiness is not empty if it is devoid of its (intrinsic nature of) being empty.

(3) If emptiness is not empty, it is empty. Emptiness keeps its (intrinsic nature of) being empty if it is not devoid of its (intrinsic nature of) being empty.

If emptiness is empty, it is not empty. If emptiness is not empty, it is empty. This is a paradigmatic case of paradox. By reductio, then, we must deny the assumption that emptiness is a real existent with its self-nature. The fallacy of reification should be avoided. ‘Emptiness’ may be used as a convenient conceptual tool to organize our experiences of the world, but the usefulness of a concept does not necessarily make it a real entity.

7. Dependent Arising and Emptiness Revisited

Buddhism disappeared from the Indian Subcontinent where it originated. Indian Mahayana traditions, along with Theravada schools, were also lost in India. Fortunately, Buddhism had already reached and flourished in East Asia. Almost all the Buddhist scriptures written in Sanskrit had been translated to Chinese before they were lost in India. Ever since the translation projects were completed in China in the 7th Century, the Chinese and other East Asian Buddhists have chosen to no longer consult Sanskrit texts. This way, the uniquely East Asian Mahayana Buddhism has developed for more than a millennium. Its traditions are very much alive today, and they are still evolving.

Contemporary East Asian Buddhism has somewhat different ways to describe the Buddhist concepts of dependent arising and emptiness. When we introduced dependent arising at the beginning of this chapter, we understood it as ‘Everything arises, abides, and ceases depending on conditions.’ The focus of Indian Buddhist schools was clearly the causation part of dependent arising. But some contemporary East Asian Buddhists often express the truth of dependent arising from a mereological point of view^[8]: ‘Everything comes into and passes out of existence as conditions gather and scatter.’ I believe that it is not the case that a new real entity comes into existence out of conditions. Rather, the point to note seems to be that everything is gathered conditions, which are to scatter, eventually, in one way or another. There is nothing over and above the conditions assembled.

A thing (or an event), which is gathered conditions, is only a fiction or an illusion. All its characteristics are borrowed from the conditions that constitute it, and thus it cannot have its own intrinsic nature. It is empty of self-nature. Each of the conditions is in its turn also gathered conditions, and it is thereby devoid of intrinsic nature. This is why East Asian Buddhism often describes the world as ‘only illusions.’ If we do not like the word “illusions” because of its negative implications, perhaps we can replace it with “phenomena” in the sense that things appear to us in such and such ways due to their conditions gathering and scattering. But we need to be careful here and should note that these phenomena do not have noumena as their ontological foundations. In Western philosophy, especially in Immanuel Kant, noumena are supposed to be ‘things-in-themselves that we know not what,’ and phenomena are the way they appear to us. In these Mahayana traditions, however, it is only phenomena that populate our world. There is no Brahman, ātman, God, soul, or things-in-themselves as long as they are claimed to exist outside the network of dependent arising.

East Asian Buddhism has understood the relation between these phenomena and emptiness as follows. Our world is the world of phenomena with all its dazzling variety if we view it from the perspective of dependent arising. There are innumerably many changes and movements of things taking place everywhere all the time. Nothing remains the same for any duration of time, and everything exhibits all its various attributes. There are actions that produce good karma, and others result in bad karma. Some people’s consciousnesses are pure, but others’ are defiled. And so on. This world is painted with so many different colors, so to speak.

However, there are no differences or discriminations in the world if we approach it from the perspective of the non-differentiating emptiness. Everything (every phenomenon) is devoid of intrinsic nature. In this respect, this world is the world of empty phenomena. We have an astonishing variety of phenomenal world observed from the viewpoint of dependent arising, and there is at the same time perfect non-differentiation, tranquility, and equilibrium if we once view the world in light of emptiness. This world with all its variety of phenomena is the world of emptiness. They are not two separate worlds.

We need to be careful here, though, about the relation between emptiness and the phenomenal world. Everything (every phenomenon) arises depending on conditions in our world (the Saha world). Due to their dependent arising, everything is empty of intrinsic nature. So, dependently arising things in this world are coextensive with empty things. As I argued in Section 5 of this chapter, however, the former group of things may not be identified with the latter group of things.

Review

Dependent Arising

The Buddha achieved his enlightenment as he realized the truth of dependent arising. ‘Dependent arising’ means ‘Everything arises, abides, and ceases depending on conditions.’

The Buddha teaches ‘dependent arising’ as follows:

When this is, that is; this arising, that arises.
When this is not, that is not; this ceasing, that ceases.

Nothing can come spontaneously out of nothing. Everything arises depending on conditions. Conditions can be physical actions, such as sprinkling salt as in the example above, or social relationships such as friendship. Also, conditions can be more inclusive.

The Buddha’s teaching was received as quite new and surprising to people 2,500 years ago at the time of the Buddha, although it is common sense to us in this age of science. Ancient people believed that there were gods eternally immutable and indestructible and that such gods presided over the universe. However, the Buddha’s teaching of ‘dependent arising’ does not accept their view that gods exist absolutely – ‘unconditionally’ – and independently of conditions

Ancient people believed in eternally immutable and indestructible soul or self that unconditionally exists even after death. However, the Buddha’s teaching of ‘dependent arising’ does not recognize the existence of such soul or self.

The Buddha’s ‘dependent arising’ challenges face to face the ancient views of cosmology and humanity based on the existence of gods and soul, respectively. It seems obvious that the teaching of dependent arising is closer to our contemporary scientific worldview.

Dependent Arising and Causation

The principal example of dependent arising is cause and its effect.

Questions 1~5 show cases of dependent relation in which effects are produced by their causes. Although causes do not necessarily result in their effects, there are reliable and probable correlations between causes and their effects. Hence, Questions 1~5 are examples of dependent arising.

Questions 6~10 are, in contrast, all about superstitious beliefs. We do not see any reliable dependent relation between presumed causes and their effects. Therefore, Questions 6~10 are not examples of dependent arising.

Dependent Arising and Relation

The Mahayana traditions of Buddhism often interpret the concept of ‘dependent arising’ more comprehensively. ‘Dependent arising’ is understood not only as taking place between cause and effect but also as the interdependent relation of things that come into and go out of existence only depending on each other.

In Mahayana traditions of Buddhism, the Buddha’s teaching of ‘dependent arising’ is comprehensively construed as interdependent relations. Things that exist in relations come into existence (arise) only depending on each other. Nothing can exist independently.

Female and male, older brother and younger brother, older sister and younger sister, husband and wife, teacher and student, seniors and juniors, up and down, left and right, front and back, east and west, south and north, large and small, high and low, light and heavy, inside and outside, bright and dark … These are some of innumerably many things that we encounter in everyday life, and we can easily see that they exist only depending on each other.

Remind yourself of the Buddha’s teaching of ‘dependent arising’ as follows:

When this is, that is; this arising, that arises.
When this is not, that is not; this ceasing, that ceases.

All the examples listed above are aptly understood in light of the Buddha’s ‘dependent arising.’ Female is female only depending on the existence of male, a teacher can be a teacher only depending on the existence of students, and outside can be outside only depending on inside. ‘Dependent arising,’ as Mahayana Buddhism teaches, includes these kinds of relations.

Comprehensive Dependent Arising 1

We have learned above that the Buddha’s teaching of ‘dependent arising’ includes causation and interdependence.

If you have answered yes to all ten questions, you are ready to understand the concept of ‘dependent arising’ comprehensively. Mahayana traditions of Buddhism, especially Tiantai and Huayan, construe the concept of ‘dependent arising’ in this comprehensive way.

Questions 1~3 point out that a whole is a whole only depending on its parts. A whole cannot exist without its parts.

Questions 4 and 5 explain that our observations of natural phenomena are made depending on our background hypotheses and theories.

Questions 6 and 7 show that beliefs are formed depending on our background theories which we accept either consciously or unconsciously. Religion, as well as science, can be regarded as a kind of background theory.

Questions 8~10 explain that concepts exist depending upon their opposites. The alive, monastics, and enlightened ones exist in contrast with the dead, laypeople, and ordinary sentient beings. Neither can exist without the other.

Comprehensive Dependent Arising 2

We learned above how to understand ‘dependent arising’ comprehensively.

We have discussed above that the following needs to be construed as ‘dependent arising’: dependent relations between a whole and its parts, between our observations of natural phenomena and their background hypotheses and theories, between beliefs and their background theories, and between concepts and their opposites. We have also learned that even things that we are not aware of arise dependently.

Questions 1 and 2 show that we come to acknowledge, if we give it a thought, the existence of such people or things which we are not always aware of.

Questions 3 and 4 lead us to think that people and things exist in their own way even if we don’t think about them during our entire lives.

Questions 5 and 6 point out that, whether we are aware of it or not, we live our lives interacting with society and the environment.

Questions 7 and 8 indicate that not only humans but also all living beings survive by interacting with all things in nature.

Questions 9 and 10 ask us to see that everything that exists is connected to everything that exists in the Universe.

The following example invites us to understand the cosmic view of the Huayan school which accepts the Buddha’s teaching of dependent arising most thoroughly. Suppose Tom lives on the Earth that belongs to the Milky Way Galaxy. He knows that the Andromeda Galaxy is the closest galaxy. Suppose that there is a planet in the Andromeda Galaxy and that a rock is on one of this planet’s mountainside. When a strong wind blows, the rock rolls down the mountainside. Whether Tom on the Earth is aware of this event or not, the rock used to be on this planet’s mountainside and is now at the bottom of it. Such change in the rock’s position occurs simultaneously to Tom on the Earth: the rock used to be on the planet’s mountainside to him but it now is at its bottom to him.

It seems intuitively clear that this change occurs not only to Tom but also to all the things that exist in this universe. A change that happens on a tiny speck of dust in a corner of the universe happens simultaneously to all other things. And even a smallest change that occurs in any object in this universe occurs simultaneously to the rock and to the tiny speck of dust in the corner of the universe. Hence, after all, everything that exists arises, abides, and ceases depending on conditions of everything that exists. This is the cosmology of Tiantai and Huayan schools of Buddhism.

The Huayan School goes a step further and teaches that all things are endlessly interdependent. That all things are connected to all things is reflected in all things, which is reflected in all things again. And these mutual penetrations are repeated infinitely and simultaneously. The world is made up of such endless mutual interpenetration.

Emptiness 1

The Buddha’s teaching of ‘dependent arising’ – everything arises, abides by, and ceases depending on conditions – evolves into the teaching of emptiness in Mahayana Buddhism. The point of emptiness is that there is no immutable intrinsic nature, that is, self-nature.

If all things arise and cease depending on conditions, nothing can exist on its own. If nothing exists on its own, then nothing can have an intrinsic nature or self-nature which makes it itself. Everything lacks immutable intrinsic nature. In this sense, everything is empty. Since everything arises dependently, and since everything arising dependently is empty, all things are empty.

Take, for example, a table among the things we use every day. Is there a self-nature that makes a table a table? A table has no fixed shape. There is no fixed material for a table, either. A table can be made of wood, plastic, metal, glass, or even ice. The number of table legs also varies. In many cases it is four, but a table can have three, one, or ten legs. Not to mention, a table can have many different colors.

In this way, a table has no immutable intrinsic nature, that is, self-nature. A table does not perform an immutable function in relation to other conditions, either. If we make a table and use it in a dining room, it becomes a dining table. When we use it to read books in a classroom or a library, it becomes a desk. Also, a table comes to be building material when a pile of tables is used to make a certain structure. A table becomes an art piece if it is decorated nicely and displayed in a museum. In addition, a wooden table comes to be fuel when it is broken into pieces and used as firewood in winter.

One and the same thing becomes a different thing depending on its given conditions. There is no self-nature, the same unique nature which performs the same function anywhere and at any time. Therefore, everything is empty in the sense that it lacks its self-nature.

Emptiness 2

Buddhism teaches that all things are empty, which means that everything lacks its immutable essence or self-nature. It does not imply that nothing exists.

The answer is five.

Questions 1~5 show that there is no immutable essence (self-nature) in natural phenomena. Clear skies have no immutable self-nature of ‘never raining.’ When showers fall from clear skies, Koreans call it “fox rain” which originates from their folklore. The sun, which appears to have the immutable essence of ‘forever burning,’ will eventually cool down and die. A river can flow in any direction among east, west, south, and north. There are fires with no smoke, such as pure hydrogen fire. And the four seasons are not always distinct in all over the world. There is, for example, no winter on the equator. Hence there is no self-nature in natural phenomena.

Questions 6~10 point out that there is no immutable self-nature in the world of plants, either. Plants from southern areas can grow in cold areas so long as they are planted in warm places like greenhouses or botanical gardens. So, bamboos can grow outside southern areas. Also, since many alternatives to soil have been available for many years, we can raise vegetables and harvest rice in our home or factory with no soil. Soil is no longer a crucial and necessary element for the growth of plants. Rice harvest is possible not just once but three times a year in warmer southern countries that have more precipitation. Also, contrary to common sense, there are plants that eat animals. In the world of plants as well, therefore, there is no immutable self-nature.

Questions 11~15 also indicate that there is no immutable self-nature in the world of animals. Dogs and cats often fight each other, but they can also care about each other and get along. Dogs are loyal and friendly, but they could attack their owners if they get rabies. People have long believed that all swans are white, but black swans live in Australia. Even being white is not a self-nature of swans. Also, there are many females that are larger than their males. Cancer is a deadly disease, but it could also heal naturally. The animal world is also empty.

Emptiness 3

We have come to realize above that man-made artifacts have no self-nature. We have also learned that natural things are empty of immutable self-nature. Now, let us examine our society and see whether its members have self-nature.

The correct answers are all ‘false’.

We are born into a family and begin social relationships with family members. It would be good if parents love their children and children respect their parents. However, we know that this is not always the case. Siblings do not have immutable obligations to each other. It is not right to assign different workloads or household chores to couples and children based on gender. The relationships among family members have no permanently fixed self-nature.

Teachers are not always right just because they are teachers. They might teach the curriculum incorrectly or might not always give students good advice. There can be no immutable absolute authority anywhere. Seniors at school or workplace do not always know more or work better than juniors. So, seniors should not always teach juniors. There is no immutable self-nature in these relationships.

Traditionally, only men have been subjected to military duty. However, this is no longer right. In the United States as well as in Israel and northern European countries, the law has been changed in such a way that both men and women are conscripted on the same formal conditions in times of emergency. In the military, subordinates should not blindly obey the commands of a superior if they do not meet standards of military discipline and laws. For example, subordinates should disobey their superior’s illegal orders to massacre innocent citizens on the battlefield. So, there is no immutable self-nature of relationship even in the military.

Citizens have basic obligations such as paying taxes and defending their countries during national emergencies. However, there is no reason for them to keep doing so if their countries use taxes inappropriately and mobilize their military forces for illegal purposes. Also, the nationality that you were given at birth can change. It is not permanent, either. The relation between citizens and their countries has no immutable self-nature. It is empty.

Relationships between the clergy and laypeople have changed over the past thousands of years and will continue to change. No permanent and immutable duty or role in a religious organization has ever existed. Nor will it exist in the future. In religion as well, social relationships have no immutable self-nature and thus are empty.

Emptiness and Non-Self

Once you answer each question correctly, you will see that each question itself provides a detailed explanation.